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Myth and Power: about the critical
psychiatry of Tbomas S. Szasz
SUMMARY
The aim of this study is to present a review and a critical evaluation of the
work of Thomas S. Szasz.
First of all the extensive work of. Szasz has been studied, resulting in a
resumé of his views regarding psychiatry, mental illness, and psychiatrists
and their patients. The work of Szasz is to be regarded as centered around
two main theses. The first thesis is theoretic and conceptual: i l lness being a
process affecting the body, mental illness as a rule doesn't fit this definition.
That is why both medical language and medical interventions are not applica-
ble. The second thesis is that, psychiatry lacking a medical-scientif ic basis,
psychiatric opinions and statements are, in fact, of a sociopolit ical nature:
psychiatry provides a system to rule out social deviants by call ing them pa-
tients. Moreover, as these patients are discriminated, stigmatized and dehu-
manized, the renaming of deviancy as mental illness is to be considered as
socially harmful.
Next an attempt is made to locate Szasz'work in historical perspective.
Since the twenties of this century there has been a continuous and forceful
expansion of psychiatry in several ways: there was a continuous enlargement
of the territory of psychiatric i l lness; there was a growing number of frames
of reference with regard to psychiatric illness; there was a growing populari-
ty of psychiatric and psychoanalytic interpretations of behavior also in the
general public; and psychiatrization also comprised a growing interference
with the judicial system. In the sixties there is a turning point. Crit icism is
coming into existence; antipsychiatry is developing; there is a critical socio-
logy concerning itself with psychiatry and psychiatric practices; psycholo-
gists object to the 'medical model' in psychiatry; juridical supervision of
involuntary psychiatric procedures and interventions is insisted upon. Szasz
is an important exponent of this crit ical counter-current.
After this an attempt is made to clarify the conception of life from which
Szasz'crit ical-psychiatric onsiderations proceed. The basic values for Szasz
are freedom and autonomy. He is to be regarded as an individualist and a
libenarian. Being preoccupied with the differences between natural science
on the one hand and the humanities on the other, he advocates a categoricai
separation of the somatic and psychic aspects of man, in this way reinforcing
a dualistic vision. Lastly he is to be characterized as a theorist and as a heretic.
Following these viewpoints the way in which he presents his views and
the structure of his arguments are considered. The study of these aspects
leads to different conclusions. On the one hand: in the development of his
argument, in the construction of his train of thought and in the presentation
of his views he shows himself as an able rhetorician and an exciting writer.
On the other hand : an analysis of his argumentation brings forth a number of
elements being detrimental to the convincing power: for instance his fre-
quent begging the quest ion; the statement that  mutuai  exclusive choices are
necessary when in fact this does not apply; the sketching of outl ines in sharp
black and white contrasts by means of generalizations, simplif ications, by
minimizing or annihilating minor differences and maximizing more impor-
tant differences as contrasts; and the use of handy but incorrect slogans
meant as 'pocket-definit ions' of complex conceptions. The conclusion is,
that in many cases his argumentation weakens rather than strengthens his
conclusions.
In the next chapter a lengthy discussion follows about Szasz'first thesis,
namely that mental i l lness is a myth. It is argued a. that the distinction i l l /
healthy is historically and logically prior to the distinction mind/body, b.
that any definit ion of i l lness should consider from the beginning how the
word ' i l l '  is defined by the i l l  person and his non-professional surroundings
rather than take the definit ion of the expert for granted, c. that'being i l l '  has
been conceptu alized in a number of different ways in history and nowadays,
and d. that i l lness and 'being i l l '  have as their implication value judgments
which are presumably absent in the'technical'Szaszian definit ion, although
the disappearance of them has serious consequences for both medicine and
psychiatry and for the patient. Therefore an alternative view is developed, the
concept of 'being i l l '  being defined as a conjunctive cluster of three consti-
tuent factors: suffering, dysfunction and abnormality. This reasoning is lea-
ding the way to a conceptualization that is different from the Szaszian one,
namely to the biopsychosocial concept of i l lness. Physicochemical abnorma-
lit ies have no sense as criteria for the existence of disease unless they are
demonstrable, relevant and processual. Notably those processes and condi-
tions, deemed as i l lnesses, without demonstrable physicochemical disturban-
ces, and among them many mental disorders, underline the fundamentalidea
that i l lness is not only an ontological concept but also a value-loaded con-
cept. The problem is posed whether or not it is desirable to take account of
these aspects of value in the definit ion of i l lness.
Psychiatric disorders, conceptualized as diseases, are problematic in seve-
ral ways. Many psychiatric symptoms have as implication a normative mea-
ning, as they denote undesirable behavior. It is very diff icult to give an opera-
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impossible. Complementary views are necessary, such as rhe quesrion of mo-
tives and motivation, the communicative significance of behavior, and the
question of the final cause. The influence of the investigator on his object of
investigation should explicit ly be taken into consideration.
Presuming that psychic occurrences do not take place in a neurophysiolo-
gical vacuum, it becomes possible in principle to identify cerebral processes
that occur at the same time as definite forms of experience or behavior. If
such processes could be identif ied, and if the accompanying behavior could
be qualif ied as abnormal, it would be possible to qualify the cluster of this
behavior and the accompanying neurophysiological process as illness in the
context of aSzaszian, biomedical concept of disease. At the same time how-
ever the validity of the sociopsychological points of view remains unaltered.
That is to say that there is no valid reason to declare this behavior as behavior
of another category (i.e. i l lness vs. non-il lness) in case the identif ication of the
accompanying neurophysiologic process is succesful.
After that, some implications of the disease-concept are studied. The bio-
medical concept of disease not only has a dualistic view of man as a necessary
Presupposition, this concept also imposes that view. Further it appears, that
in the context of a biomedical disease-concept hysicochemical explanations
are overvalued. Next the problem of the validation of psychiatric disorders is
exposed, and compared to the problem of validation in general medicine.
Validation in psychiatry is difficult, the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses is
relatively small and moreover very context-dependent, and predicrive validi-
ty is low. After that the connection between problems-in-l iving and psychia-
tric disorders is studied, and the connection between causality and responsi-
bil i ty as contributing factors. Two viewpoints are considered in this respecr:
psychiatric i l lness as irrationality, and psychiatric i l lness as loss of freedom.
This last viewpoint is accepted as a necessary and sufficient interpretation.
Some problems that arise when applying this principle of explanation are
regarded.
With respect to physicians, it appears that the biomedical concept of i l l-
ness has territorial properties as disease in this concept can be described as rhe
domain of the physician. The biopsychosocial i lness-concept is comparably
inapt to territorial claims by its complexity and its extensiveness.
Two professional roles of the psychiatrist, i.e. the role of therapist and the
role of social arbiter are considered next. The role of therapist is characteri-
zed by an offer either of a therapy emphasizing the goal and desirability of
change (that is to say a change of the disorder and a change of the parient
himself) or of an attendance mphasizing the acceptance of the patient and his
disorder just as they are. The relations between these two basic different
offers on the one hand, and the question as to what degree the patient is to be
held responsible for his disorder or misconduct on the other hand, are consi-
dered. It is argued that, as a basic notion, nobody can leave to any other the
responsibil iry for his own life without a grave risk of serious and essential
disadvantage for himself. The being held non-responsible for a psychiatric
disorder has as an advantage in that it frees the patient from feelings of guilt,
but as a disadvantage in as much as it seduces him to an attitude of passive
expectation and dependency with respect to what ought to be done. This is
seen as the central dilemma of psychiatric assistance.
The role of the psychiatrist as a social arbiter is being clarif ied by way of
two performances of this role. The first is the role of judge with regard to the
question whether i l lness exists, and whether the existence of this i l lness entit-
les the patient to certain privileges. It is argued that, although the prerogatives
of the sick role lead to the institution of the arbitration, it appears that there
are too many insecurit ies, too many undesirable side-effects and too grave
disabling effects; and that, in the end, it is nevertheless the patient, in most
cases, who, be it unofficially, takes the decision. Therefore it is preferable to
restore the autonomy of people by giving them back the right to claim that
they are i l l , and also that they are healthy again. In that case there is no reason
left for a prerogative of the sick role over the role of people who can't work
for other reasons beyond their control.
The second role is the role of the psychiatrist as a member of so-called
'abortion-teams' as an example of a role that is to be characterized as 'boot-
legging' of societal prerogatives.
Given the biomedical concept of i l lness, the image of the psychiatric pa-
tient, as is to be derived from Szasz' statements on the subject, is not too
promising. Data from the l iterature regarding the negative image of the psy-
chiatric patient don't seem to confirm fully Szasz' opinions in this respect,
nor the negative image of psychiatric treatment and hospitalization.
The therapeutic relationship between patient and psychiatrist is described
as an asymmetrical, contractual relationship based on trust. Recent develop-
ments menacing this relationship are described. First of all there is more and
more a splitt ing of the loyalty of the psychiatrist versus his patient: in the
beginning he had only to regard the interests of his patients, of his own self,
and the rules of his craft. More recently loyalties were added toward the
other members of the multidisciplinary team, toward the institution that em-
ploys him, toward the insurance companies, toward the Government. Se-
condly, an increasing number of agencies interfere with the therapeutic rela-
tionship, often presenting themselves as - uncalled for - protectors of the
patient. It is argued that these developments, at least in sofar as they are
meant to enlarge the power of the patient in the therapeutic relationship, are
to be regarded as failures, by making the patient increasingly powerless.
In everyday l ife it appears that the biomedical i l lness-concept has been
relinquished for the most part in the work of general practit ioners and psy-
chiatrists, and that in daily practice different concepts of i l lness are mixed up
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This often leads to confusion
Alongside the conceptual-theoretical definition there are to be taken into
account three ancillary definitions of illness emerging from the functioning
of physicians, patients and others: f irst of all i l lness is a form of human misery
giving rise to the profession of doctors; second it is a form of human misery
giving rise to the sick role with its obligations and prerogatives for the pa-
tients; third it is a form of human misery that gave birth to an industrial-
medical complex. The most important aspect of these three ancil lary defini-
t ions is, that they point to three groups that have a direct interest in anything
that is said and written about i l lness and conversely, that in all considerations
about i l lness these ancil lary definit ions, and the consequences for these three
groups of people, need be taken into account.
In case the concept of i l lness is used to give a justif ication of procedures
and interventions that occur against the expressed wishes of the patient, a
borderline is being trespassed: the medical-ethical fundamental law prescri-
bing that examination, treatment and therapy are allowed only with consent
and co-operation of the patient in that case is violated. In the presence of
somatic disease that seldom occurs, in psychiatry on the contrary it happens
regularly. With regard to the concept of psychiatric disorder this has some
consequences: nearly all sociopsychological explanatory theories are desig-
ned for and validated within the medical-ethical boundaries of contractual
relationships between psychiatrist and patient; this moral context being
changed, again the question of the validity of the explanatory theory has to be
posed. Apart from that, in those cases where the'patient' is arguing that he is
free and that his condition is chosen for, an essential aspect of psychiatric
illness is lacking, namely the manifest restriction of personal liberty and au-
tonomy. The restriction of freedom in these cases is to be inferred indirectly
from the manifestations of the psychiatric disorder, but is not to be confir-
med from the experience of the patient.
Involuntary commitment in a mental hospital by juridical means is next
being considered as the by Szasz most commented upon intervention in psy-
chiatry. Commitment in mental hospitals in the Netherlands is involuntary
in about r 5"/" oÍ all cases, the number of involuntary commitments being
about j.ooo annually. In the usA the percentage is higher, in the urc lower.
The main justification of this intervention from a psychiatric point of view is,
that it is for the good of the patient; from a juridical point of view, that a
person is potentially dangerous for himself or for others. As in the new Law
on Involunary Commitment in the Netherlands (de wet oolz) the view-
point of dangerousness has been introduced, the usefulness of this criterion
was studied. The problems that rise in the use of the criterion of dangerous-
ness are extremely complex; on theoretical grounds and on reviewing the
research that has been done the conclusion emerges, that predictions are very
inaccurate, and are - as a rule - incorrect in the great majority of cases. The
meaning of this is, that prediction of dangerousness is correct only in a relati-
vely small proportion of involuntarily committed patienrs, rherefore in all
other cases there appears to be no justification for involuntary commitment.
Additional insecurity originates from the notion that it is hardly possible to
learn from experience as on the one hand the commitment changes some-
one's circumstances in such a way as to make any valuable feedback on the
decision virtually impossible, and as on the other hand moral pressure has the
influence of promoting civil commitment. Notwithstanding rhese facrors,
involuntary commitment ought to be considered as a grave intervention, and
as an intervention with grave consequences for the person involved.
The striking of the balance, as far as is possible with regard ro the know-
ledge that is currently available, leads to the conclusion, that involuntary
commitment ought to be abolished.
In order to diminish the risks, a transition period of five years is proposed.
In that period, alternative strategies can be created, and the structure of men-
tal health care adapted. Proposals are made rc realize these goals.
